

The shocking report on the Muslim Brotherhood, which wants to establish Sharia law in France; In 73 pages documented by the intelligence services, the study submitted to Bruno Retailleau paints a glaring picture of a country undermined from within. The declassified version, revealed by "Le Figaro," is explosive.

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Byline: Chichizola, Jean, Cornevin, Christophe

Body

*We, the Muslim Brotherhood, are like a vast hall into which any Muslim can enter through any door to share whatever he wishes. Should he seek Sufism, he will find it. Should he seek understanding of Islamic jurisprudence, he will find it.*

*If he were looking for sports and scouting, they are here. If he were looking for combat and armed struggle, he would find them. (...) You came to us with a concern for the "nation." Thus, I welcome you.*" This harangue was uttered in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Ismaïlia. This virulent proselytism, never denied since then, had only one goal: to recruit for the eventual establishment of an Islamic state and the yoke of Sharia law. Nearly a century later, it is clear that France has become a gateway, open, gaping. The government's shocking report entitled "The Muslim Brotherhood and Political Islamism in France," recently submitted at the request of Interior Minister Bruno Retailleau, and revealed by **Le Figaro** exclusively, is enough to convince you.

To support their demonstration, the authors, a prefect and an ambassador, made ten field trips to France and four to Europe during the first half of 2024, with an update contribution of the diplomatic network. Before releasing this explosive document, stamped "secret" in its original version and commissioned a year ago by three ministries (Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces and Interior), they met no fewer than 45 French and foreign academics of various persuasions. Not to mention a series of meetings with Muslim leaders, both at the national and local, including three with those of Muslims of France, considered as the emanation of the



Muslim Brotherhood in France. In addition to a review of academic articles and works on the issue, they also held in-depth discussions with the intelligence services, the Quai d'Orsay, and all the administrations involved in analyzing and monitoring the phenomenon.

In 73 pages documented by the intelligence services, the report paints an edifying picture of a country undermined from within by a brotherhood that has structured a **"significant network of settlements" there**. The document thus reveals **that "a total of 139 places of worship, affiliated with the Muslims of France"**, presented as **"the main emanation of the Brothers in France"** although they deny it, are **"listed on the national territory, to which are added 68 considered as close to the federation, spread across 55 departments."** **"That is 7% of the 2,800 Muslim places of worship listed on national soil and 10% of those opened over the period 2010 - 2020 (45 out of 447)"** specify the authors who estimate that **"the overall attendance of mosques affiliated or close to the movement amounts to an average of 91,000 worshippers on Fridays."** If **"the federation of Muslims of France currently only claims affiliation with 53 associations,"** the document, declassified before its release, states that the **"gathered elements, however, indicate 280 associations attached to the movement, operating in a multitude of sectors surrounding the life of Muslims (religious but also charitable, educational, professional, youth or even financial)."** The **"circle restricted"** of the movement, that is to say the **"hard core" "likely to be sworn in"** to lead this **secret organization**, would be estimated according to **"attentive observers of the movement"** at **"400 people and would not exceed, in any case, a maximum of 1,000 people"**. **"The budget of Muslims of France, would be, according to him, of the order of 500,000 euros, a decrease of half in the last five years,"** assess the analysts, who observe that **"the lack of organization of the annual gathering at Le Bourget, which in the 2010s brought together more than 100,000 Muslims of all persuasions, weighed heavily on its finances."** Via endowment funds to which the movement had **"massive recourse at the end of the 2000s"** as well as SCI, **"the "Projects of Muslims in France were able to benefit until 2019 from foreign funding from Qatar,"** notes the report, which lists the sites in Strasbourg, Mulhouse, Villeneuve-d'Ascq, Schiltigheim, Lille, Marseille and mosques in Seine-Saint-Denis. Funds from Saudi Arabia are also said to have come to irrigate a structure in Mulhouse as well as the Institute European Institute of Human Sciences (IESH), specializing in Arabic teaching and learning of the Quran.

A solid core of denominational schools, abundant charities and a powerful pool of preachers. **"The education sector appears to be the priority of the French branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, to a degree that distinguishes it from its European counterparts"** notes the report, which reveals that in September 2023, **"21 establishments were identified as linked to the "Muslim Brotherhood" movement (18 directly and three deemed close) which welcomes a total of 4,200 students for the current year."** **"Only five Muslim establishments have an association contract with the State, three of which are affiliated with the National Federation of Private Muslim Education (Fnem) "**, adds the document which notably takes stock of the situation at the Averroès high school in Lille, whose prefect has requested the termination of the association contract with the State. Described as **"the flagship establishment of Muslim education in France"**, the latter was the subject of an audit carried out by the regional audit office which **"revealed the receipt of illicit financing in the form of loans with abandonment of debts from neighbouring mosques and by the Islamic centre of Villeneuve-d'Ascq, itself financed by Kuwait, Qatar and Egypt", "serious deficiencies among the educational resources made available to students"** and the presence of works with **"content contrary to republican values"**, in particular works signed by Imam Iquioussen, of the Muslim Brotherhood, listed as S and deported to Morocco and **"forty hadiths from Imam An-Nawawi"** advocating **"the prohibition of women from mixing with men and being examined by a man, the prohibition of apostasy under penalty of death and the preeminence of divine laws over all others"**.

The evidence gathered on the al-Kindi high school, located in Decines near Lyon, could lead to the prefecture to initiate **"proceedings against it,"** warns the report, which states that this **"elitist" establishment**, which **"educates 608 students,"** "constitutes, along with the Villeurbanne mosque, one of the main foundations of the Rhône Brotherhood movement. " **"The latter's investment in the education sector is taking place in a context of a continuous increase in attacks to secularism recorded in schools, fueled by the activity of online preachers,"** insists the declassified document, which mentions a "peak" of 3,309 **"attacks on secularism for the first quarter of 2023-2024 alone,"** marked by the ban on the abaya in September, the October 7 massacre and the war in Gaza, then the attack against Dominique Bernard in October.

The data revealed by the report are staggering, such as the **"815 Koranic schools identified at the beginning of 2024 throughout the country (excluding overseas territories and Paris), welcoming a total of 66,050 minor students."** More than a third of them **"operate within a fundamentalist movement of Islam,**

including 114 attached to the Muslim Brotherhood movement.

On social media, the **"dynamism of preaching 2.0"** is taking over, with **"influencers"** who **"are often a first gateway to discovering Islam and have become the link between Islamist ideologies and young French-speaking Europeans."** The document

sounds the alarm on **"the activism of a new generation of preachers, often trained by the first religious leaders of the movement and (...) subjects of a hybridization with Salafism"** which **"constitutes a major factor in the diffusion of Islamism via social networks, where they meet a large audience"**. Among **"the twenty influencers having a real impact on the networks,"** the report cites **"this Islamist activist very often referring to Tariq Ramadan."** According to an informed source, this is Marwan Muhammad, former director of the Collective Against Islamophobia in France (CCIF), now exiled in Canada. Quietly, the Muslim Brotherhood octopus is tightening its grip thanks to a network of around **"thirty Islamist charities identified with national level, including 16 led by Salafists and four belonging or having belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood movement."** One of them, Humani'terre, created in 2018 to collect funds for the Palestinian population, is the subject of a preliminary investigation for corporate financing. terrorist for the benefit of Hamas.

In its constant search for "legitimacy and respectability," the Muslim Brotherhood has been advancing in disguise to create veritable ecosystems. Since the 1980s, the movement has sought to fit within the legal framework of the former UOIF - Union of Islamic Organizations in France - which, the report states, **"only declares a portion of its activities and the associations affiliated with it."**

**to limit the surveillance of the French authorities on the exact extent of the movement."** Very well informed, the authors of the document describe: **"A dual organization is put in place, the official structure being doubled by an Islamic leadership council, known only to the members and responsible for establishing the strategy of the organization."** Making the veil the **"standard bearer of the preservation of religion in a secularized and secular context"** after the affair of the veiled girls at the Creil college in 1989, the movement also **"mobilizes"** on the **" establishment of a halal sector, the promotion of Islamic finance."** **"These themes still irrigate the members of Muslims of France and are recorded in certain territories,"** insists the report which also recalls

that the issue of **"Islamophobia" and its corollary, victimization (...) remains very present today at the level of local associations."** If the public discourse of the UOIF and then of the Federation of Muslims of France avoids lighting the fire on **"state Islamophobia"**, leaving this field to the former Collective against Islamophobia in France (CCIF), the report insists on the calls for **"commitment in community and public life to assert a Muslim identity."** The movement is gently polishing its image to appease the authorities, particularly the Ministry of the Interior, to the point of joining the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM).

The movement **"is thus legitimized and this new respectability has accentuated the development of ecosystems at the local level,"** the report deplores.

Analysts are dismantling the cogs of an inexorable mechanism. Since the 1990s, these ecosystems that **"manage the life of Muslims from birth to death"** have been absorbed on a territorial scale thanks to the relays of actors (associations, influencers, occasionally elected officials) sometimes connected to the movement but increasingly acting in a hybridization with the

Salafism. **"Formed around a mosque generally offering Quranic education courses,"** these ecosystems include **"community businesses or sports activities separate from the mosque, before investing in the field of private education."** **"Travel, personal development, employment assistance or dating sites are part of the range of developed activities,"** describes the report, which specifies that the map of these ecosystems intersects with that of Muslim concentrations. **"Taking root in generally impoverished Muslim-majority neighborhoods, most often priority intervention areas for city policy, they respond to the needs of the population,"** insists the report, which continues: **"The managers, often seasoned activists, interact with the municipality, most often in the context of a clientelist relationship, to advance their positions. Social norms (veil, beard, clothing, observance of the Ramadan fast) are imposed here and there, as the ecosystem solidifies.** If the gangrene seems to be spreading throughout the country, **"they appear to be the densest in the Rhône-Alpes region, in the North, the Grand Est, in Île-de-France and in Bouches-du-Rhône."**

Articulated within **"baronies less dependent on the national level"**, this **"modality of territorial action is today replicated by other associations, independent or belonging to other sensibilities, hybridized on the ideological level, in particular to respond to a quest identity of young Muslims."** Concerned, analysts note that the promoters of a re-Islamization of society **"borrow from the protest militancy of the Muslim Brotherhood movement and from Salafism, even from traditional Malikism, to mobilize their adherents."** In the Lyon region,

no less **than "around fifty Muslim associations (...) more generally displaying a Muslim Brotherhood sensibility are listed,"** reveals the report, which explains that **"two important mosques,"** including that of Villeurbanne according to our information, and a school establishment play a **"structuring role."** Omnipresent, the religious have an influence in all directions **"in the areas of charity and humanitarian aid, religious training, family, marriage, professional integration, Muslim entrepreneurship, consumer protection, personal services, adult education"** and, of course, the **"fight against Islamophobia."** This total control results in a **"rigorization of religious practice with a very high number of young girls wearing the abaya and the massive and visible increase in little girls wearing the veil."** Supported **"by a powerful Wahhabi-Salafist motive,"** this **"veiling phenomenon"** now concerns children **"sometimes 5-6 years old."** These "lion cubs" of radical Islam augur the worst in a threatened Republic.

The report recalls that, in France and in Europe, this Brotherhood offensive began some time ago seventy years old.

**"Thanks to migratory movements and the repression against them in the Muslim world from the 1950s onwards,"** the first Muslim Brotherhood members came from the Middle East **"settled in Great Britain, Germany and Switzerland."** Then some **"settled in Belgium, France and Italy."** In France, still in the 1950s, a **"religious consciousness emerged among immigrant Muslim workers, notably around the figure of an Indian scholar, a political refugee, Mohammed Hamidullah, who preached in Paris, at the mosque**

**Daawa, rue de Tanger.** » Hamidullah was behind the creation in 1963 of the Association of Islamic Students of France (AEIF). At the same time, the son-in-law of Hassan al-Banna (founder of the brotherhood in Egypt in 1928), Saïd Ramadan, was forced to leave his native Egypt and went to Switzerland. In 1961, he founded the Islamic Center of Geneva, **"created with the support of Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia and which is rapidly moving closer to the emerging AEIF in France, with which links are developing."**

In France in the 1970s and 1980s, we observe **"the structuring of the movement with the contribution of Syrian and Egyptian currents."** Arriving at the beginning of the 1980s, two students, scholars in religious sciences, manage to unify them. Faycal Mawlawi, of Lebanese nationality, and the Tunisian Ahmed Jaballah, are **"identified as direct emissaries of the Brotherhood and considered the most important organic intellectuals"** of a French movement, which was structured from 1983 within the Union of Islamic Organizations in France (UOIF).

This remarkable progression is explained by the fact that, from the beginning, **"the Muslim Brotherhood designed the matrix of political Islamism adapted to be implanted in the West."**

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The construction of the Brotherhood's ideology is detailed. **"From the outset,"** the text specifies, **"Islam was conceived by the Muslim Brotherhood as an integralist system, governing all areas of life of the Muslim, beyond the purely religious field."** For Hassan al-Banna, the founder in 1928 of the Brotherhood in an Egypt dominated by the English, **"Islam is the solution** (in the face of) **the military, political, ethnic and social invasion from the West."** His project is structured **"around two objectives: the creation of an Islamic State and the application of Sharia law."** He theorizes a **"strategy of Western conquest"** : **"We will pursue this evil force to its own lands, invade its western heartland and fight to defeat it until the whole world cries out in the name of the Prophet."**

For the rapporteurs, **"derived from a political ideology which was westernized to be implanted in Europe, the matrix of Islamism established by the Muslim Brotherhood combines the inculturation of a Middle Eastern tradition in the countries of establishment and the tactical concealment of a subversive fundamentalism."**

The determinants of this project are recalled by the report. First, the **"preeminence of Koranic law."**

Then, a **"conception of otherness, particularly religious, with variable geometry,"** by example when a leader of the movement highlights his ecclesiastical friendships and castigates in a video **"the lies spread in the name of Christianity"** by affirming **"the superiority of the Koranic narrative and the falseness of the others"**. Another determining factor for an ideology remaining **"founded on a sexo-specific, even sexual determination"** which establishes non-mixing as a rule and instrumentalizes the wearing of the veil: **"the inferiorization of women but the valorization of veiled women"** with the active role of the wives of leaders of the movement and **"a third generation of women"**.

The last major determinant: **"the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the eternal source of anti-Zionism, even of increasingly obvious anti-Semitism."** This conflict acts **"as a catalyst for the anti-Zionism historically carried by the Brotherhood and its mutation into anti-Semitism within the movement, thanks to means such as conspiracy theories, the reduction "ad Israel" (amalgamating Israelis and Jews), the idea of an irreducible Muslim identity (reference**

*to Islamic anti-Judaism) or a natural enmity between Jews and Muslims."* In France, the report notes, *"anti-Semitism remains present in the discourse of members of the movement."* *"Since the attacks of October 7,* the experts insist, *we have seen a rise in anti-Zionist activities within mosques, fueled by the anger aroused by the human toll of Israeli reprisals*

*in Gaza."* In a mosque in Essonne, in this case the one in Massy, very well-informed sources assure, *"anti-Zionist preachers and speakers"* were thus invited *"to discuss the situation in Palestine"* and a former Palestinian minister proclaimed *"I am Hamas"* to the applause of the faithful...

The Brotherhood's establishment strategy is ultimately based on concealment, the quest for legitimacy, and the denunciation of Islamophobia. A follower of the cult of secrecy, the Brotherhood, whose members join after following a "ten-step process," is based, the report reveals, on a *"dual organization, one official to respect the legal framework and the other secret, around a council of judges."* On the subject of double talk, the report quotes Chakib Benmakhlouf, former president of the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, now the Council of European Muslims, who recognizes that the European legal framework makes it possible to *"present the model of a decent Muslim who is considered a good model for propagating Islam of positive way without drawing attention (...) to the fact that we are Islamizing the West."*

The concept of Islamophobia has been established since the 2000s. The report notes that the UOIF or Muslims of France *"have maintained a cautious position on the subject, leaving the reins to associations of the more identity-based movement"* such as, *"first and foremost",* the CCIF, dissolved in 2020 and which subsequently became the CCIE based in Brussels. Finally, the two authors also note that *"a porosity exists between activists in the fight against "Islamophobia" and "decolonial" activists"* such as *"the Party of the Natives of the Republic."* *"More generally,"* concludes their study, *" the interfaces between the Brotherhood movement and intersectional activism exist but remain occasional to date."*

*(e.g. national march against Islamophobia on November 10, 2019) due to significant differences, particularly the LGBT issue.*

The report also judges *that "losing influence in the Arab-Muslim world, the Muslim Brotherhood is concentrating its action in Europe ."* Their influence is thus *"continuously declining in Africa."*

*North and the Middle East."* Only Senegal and Mauritania are exceptions, although with moderate influence. Erdogan's Turkey is presented as an *"exception,"* and as *"the Middle Eastern epicenter of the Brotherhood."* *"On a Middle Eastern scale,"* it is specified, *"Turkey, along with Qatar, has formed a powerful axis of support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which opposes that formed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates."* Ankara has thus become *"the rear base"* for campaigns such as the boycott of French products after Emmanuel Macron's Les Mureaux speech on separatism. Turkey *"also provides essential logistical and financial support to the European branch of the Brotherhood."*

A brotherhood that is banking heavily on Europe. Firstly through *"a structured network of organizations, particularly for lobbying community institutions"* with a *"keystone"* : the Council of European Muslims (CEM). Then come *"activist organizations, satellites of the CEM"* : the European Council for Fatwa and Research (with three executives from Muslims of France), the Forum of European Muslim Youth Organizations (FEMYSO), the Institutes

European humanities ("private higher education"), Europe Trust ("financial arm"), Islamic Relief Worldwide (humanitarian), European Council of Imams without forgetting *"the structuring of a women's network".*

This associative base allows *" a strategy of entryism of the European institutions "* in the service, the rapporteurs remark with a touch of irony, of a *"singular vision of religious freedom made up of denunciation of "Islamophobia", demands for the criminalization of blasphemy, or even the deployment of halal"...* These same European institutions *"are also a major source of funding for the movement."* However, in Paris and concerning European funding and the Erasmus+ program, the Ministry of Higher Education has recorded *"for two years an increase in alerts linked to the financing of projects contrary to republican values and belonging to radical Islamism"...*

The report highlights the effectiveness of this policy of influence. And we still remember the tensions between France, the Commission, and certain Member States over the issue of funding. This timidity on the part of certain countries is all the more surprising given that the Brotherhood has *"solid national bases in Europe."* This is the case in Belgium, described as the *"European crossroads of the Brotherhood movement,"* with a *"close network of associations and organizations."* But also in Austria and Germany ,

*historically the first lands of establishment of the movement"* where, moreover, the influence of Millî Görüş, *"the other European Islamist movement inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood"*, directly linked to Ankara, is felt. For its part, Northern Europe (Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden) is described as *"territory*

**lesser but real implantation of the movement.**

The United Kingdom is, according to the report, **"an outpost of the Middle Eastern movement"** on the continent. Finally, analysts believe that, some thirty years after the war in the former Yugoslavia, the Balkans are **"the main prospect for the development of the movement in Europe."** With the

A highly opportunistic project to take advantage of the region's rapprochement with the European Union. In 2022, a European Council for the Holy Quran was created in Sarajevo before moving to Milan.

**"The risk of extending Erasmus funding to Quranic institutions located in the Balkans in candidate countries,"** the report notes, "is both a risk for the EU and an opportunity clearly identified by the movement."

Keen to regain control, the State wants to raise **"awareness of the effects of political Islamism in France."** Faced with the breakthrough of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, **"the action of the public authorities still faces an insufficient understanding of the phenomenon,"** the report slams. To explain this deadly **"blind spot,"** the authors cite

the **"temporal nature"** of a threat **"less immediate than that presented by the terrorist risk."** A prefect sums up: **"Between an Islamist who plows his furrow for a generation and a radicalized person likely to take action, the arbitration is made."** Added to this is the **"cult of secrecy"** and the **"politics of respectability"** observed by the Brotherhood, which prospers quietly on a **"local level more than national."** Faced with this offensive, France will have to, more than ever, sharpen its response.

Graphic

FRANCE - RELIGION - MUSLIM - COMMUNAUTARISM - LAICITY - ABAYA

NICOLAS GUYONNET/Hans Lucas via AFP

Two women wearing a full abaya, in Valence (Drôme), in 2023.

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